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THE ABSTRACT • FALL 2007 
Attorneys Fees, Offsets and Priorities 
In Behniwal v. Mix, 147 Cal App 4th 
621, a 2007 California decision, pur-
chasers prevailed in their action for 
specific performance of a contract, to 
purchase the vendors' residence. Since 
there had 'been three trials and appeals 
of this matter, and since there was an 
attorneys' fees clause in the contract, 
the trial court awarded the purchasers 
$250,000 attorneys' fees and offset it 
against the $540,000 purchase price 
that they owed. The court of appeal 
'held that this offset was error, for rea-
sons that might cause surprise to most 
attorneys, although lenders' counsel 
might be glad to learn of them. 
onsets v. Priorities 
First, the. court held that the right of 
offset is subject to the law of priori-
ties, meaning that a party to a lawsuit 
cannot automatically assert a right of 
offset - even ifhe otherwise entitled to 
one - if that would be inconsistent with 
the rules of lien priorities. Normally, if 
A owes B $100 and B owes A another 
$100, the two debts offset each other 
so that A does not have to pay B the 
$100 that she owes him. But, Behniwal 
held that if B has other claimants to 
that money whose interests in it are 
determined to be superior to A's claim, 
then A may have to pay B - despite 
the fact that she is at the same time 
owed money by B, in order to be fair 
to C, B's superior claimant. In this 
case, the sellers only asset was their 
house, on which three liens (two of 
them mortgages) had recentlymateri-
alized, which made A's having to pay B 
so that C could collect would lead to A 
being unable to enforce her offsetting 
debt from B. 
I think most attorneys would have 
predicted the opposite result, i.e. they 
would have assumed that the law of 
offsets prevailed over the law of pri-
orities, because many cases often treat 
an offsetting debt as having already 
been paid, pro tanto (as if the pur-
chasers in Behniwal had already actu-
ally paid $250,000 of the $540,000 
price to the sellers). But this decision 
said no, at least as far as California 
goes. Compare that with Chapman v. 
Olbrich, 217 SW3d 482, a Texas case 
also decided just this year, that seems 
to be minded to go the other way. Can 
you predict what the outcome would be 
in your state? 
Priority Against Other Claims 
Second, the court held that the plain-
tiffs' attorneys' fee claim came in 
fourth - behind a $238,000 deed of 
trust given by the sellers to World 
Savings Bank, two other deeds of 
trust totaling $70,000 given to their 
attorneys, and a homestead exemp-
tion (equal to $150,000) recorded by 
the sellers on their residence. Since 
all three of those interests arose after 
the plaintiffs had filed their specific 
performance action, how did they 
by Roger Bernhardt* 
achieve higher priority than the plain-
tiffs' attorneys' fees claim? 
The court held that the reason the' 
attorneys' fees claim came in last was 
because it constituted only tn ordinary 
money judgment that did not take 
effect until it was awarded, entered, 
and then recorded. Since none of that 
could happen until the end of the trial, 
the three rival claims against the sellers 
had priority of it because they had all 
been recorded prior to that date. 
I think most attorneys would have 
again predicted the opposite result, i.e. 
they would have assumed that since the 
decree of specific performance related 
back to the inception of the lawsuit, the 
award of attorneys fees would there-
fore do the same, as an incident of that 
decree, instead of being characterized 
as a separate money judgment with an 
independent and later priority, as this 
case held. Relation back priority is 
often true for an attorney's lien on an 
award to her client for fees the client 
owed to her (see, for instance, Mahesh 
v. Mills, 607 NW2d 618, Mich., 1999), 
but that is different from the claim of 
contractual attorney's fees sought by 
the client against the other party. 
If the fees do not themselves relate 
back, then neither I) the fact that the 
first deed of trust was taken with con-
structive notice of the lawsuit (because 
of a recorded lis pendens, discussed 
next), nor 2) the fact that the deeds 
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of trust given to the sellers' attorneys 
were undoubtedly taken with actual 
knowledge of the litigation (after all, 
the attorneys were defending it), and 
was probably for services to be ren-
dered in the case, like a future advance 
arrangement, nor 3) the fact that. the 
homestead declaration was recorded 
by the sellers after the filing of the 
lawsuit against them which was based 
upon a sales contract which included 
an agreed on attorneys' fees clause in 
it, mattered, since the ordinary money 
judgment for attorneys fees was riot 
(and could not be) recorded until after 
all of that happened. Notice or knowl-
edge of what is held to corne beneath 
you does not put it in front of you. So 
all of the rival creditors prevailed. 
This was a California decision. Do 
you know what your state would say 
on this priorities question? What do 
you tell a litigation minded client 
about the risk that his adversary may 
subject the property that he is trying 
to acquire to liens which can destroy 
the value of the attorneys' fee clause 
in the contract? How do you describe 
the risk to a potential lender who sees 
a lis pendens on property that he is 
being asked to finance? 
The Lis Pendens and 
Relation Back 
Third, the court held that the lis pen-
dens - recorded at the very outset of 
the litigation - did not give the pur-
chasers any superpriority over the three 
competing liens. It gave notice only of 
their attempt to pursue specific per-
formance and thereby have to pay the 
price to the vendors; it did not give 
notice of a further claim for attorneys 
fees, because that has no relationship 
to the issues of title or possession of 
the property in issue, which is what 
a California lis pendens is all about. 
Title ordered by the decree of specific 
performance would relate back to the 
date of filing the lis pendens, but not 
the money awarded to pay the victori-
ous plaintiff's attorneys fees. 
I think, for the third time, that many 
attorneys would have again predicted 
the opposite result - we would have 
assumed that the title and the price 
were sufficiently related as to be tied 
together in the lis pendens. See Scott v. 
Majors, 980 P2d 214, Utah, 1999. But 
Behniwal held that the only response 
of a potential lender who saw notice 
of a specific performance action would 
be that the price paid by a victorious 
buyer would be a good substitute for 
the title held by the defeated seller if 
that happened, and would give that 
lender no reason to regard the security 
as impaired. 
Who Cares? 
The winners and losers in this case are 
not quite what they might appear to 
be. The purchasers prevailed, but they 
had to pay the sellers the full $540,000 
purchase price, rather than the net 
$290,000 the trial court would have 
imposed on them. Of that $540,000, 
$238,000 will go first to World Savings 
Bank, $70,000 will go to the seller's 
attorneys, and $150,000 will be pro-
tected by the homestead exemption. 
Since those claims total $458,000, that 
leaves only $82,000 remaining for off-
set, as against the purchasers' entitle-
ment of $250,000 for their attorneys 
fees, or a shortfall of $168,000. The 
defeated defendants' attorneys may 
have charged less, but seems much 
more likely to recover what they were 
owed than are the attorneys for the vic-
torious plaintiffs. Let's hope that they 
did not also have the case on a contin-
gent fee basis! • 
